Citizens of Nowhere

Paul Embery, a 'Blue Labour' activist who has gained particular prominence for his opposition to Freedom of Movement made the following statement yesterday on Twitter:

'A nation is not a home.'
I fear this encapsulates the divide in our society - between a rootless, cosmopolitan, bohemian middle-class (in this case a bloke who used to sing folk songs on the BBC) and a rooted, communitarian, patriotic working-class.


This rightly attracted a large amount of criticism, as he used the same juxtaposition of the words 'rootless' and 'cosmopolitan' as Stalin during the antisemitic campaign of 1948-53. His claim that this was a coincidence would be a little more convincing if these terms were themselves part of the every day political vernacular. But let's say for a moment we give him the benefit of the doubt. Even if he was not aware of the antisemitic connotations of the phrase, this does not make it benign. It still appeals to the narrative of disloyal internationalists undermining the nation state. It still separates society into those who have roots, who fit into the community, and those who do not. It still seeks to otherise people who may easily be fitted into the latter group in a way that can pave the way for genuinely troubling developments. This is made particularly clear by their contrast with a ‘communitarian, patriotic working class’, itself a kind of mythologised infantilisation. If nothing else, this is exactly the kind of thought process which at some stage may lead back to antisemitism, though it is quite possible to imagine other groups of people fulfilling the same function in this kind of narrative.

This is equally true of Suella Braverman's use of the term 'cultural Marxism'. The term is very much an antisemitic code on the alt-right, and to unapologetically use the term anyway, and double down once this has been pointed out is quite shocking. But even if it were possible to separate the term from these connotations, and even if she were not using the term with these connotations in mind, it still appeals to this same troubling narrative of the third column of internationally minded intellectuals undermining the nation state. Theresa May managed precisely this, in her famous 'citizens of nowhere' speech to the Conservative Party conference in 2017, echoing David Goodhardt's distinction in The Road to Somewhere. That she did so did not make her speech benign.

The point here is not that the antisemitic connotations of these terms are not troubling. They are very much so, many who use them do so with that explicit intention, and those claim they do not do not seem sufficiently bothered by the knowledge of this once it is pointed out. But even if there was some extent to which these narratives were no longer uniquely a means of expressing antisemitism, they still appeal to a similar narrative of the enemy within and still fundamentally have the effect of otherising a section of society as somehow not of the nation. Even if the similarity of the terms used to historical ones is not conscious, that does not necessarily make that similarity coincidental: it may suggest similar thought processes behind them. I don't know which 'somewhere' this is the road to, but I for one don't want to go there.

The political case for liberal Keynesianism

A number of commentators have said that there is a gaping hole in the centre of British politics, waiting to be filled by a credible political party without the historical baggage of the Liberal Democrats. Definitional questions of centrism notwithstanding, I don't think this is quite right. The big space waiting to be filled in British politics is for a party willing to stand on a progressive, pro-european, Keynesian platform. It would highlight the horrendous social consequences of fiscal tightening on social expenditure, but also make a robust case for an expansive fiscal policy as economically credible. It would stand on an explicitly pro-european platform, but incorporate that into a story about how remaining in the EU, or at least the single market, and preserving the institutional framework for European cooreration as much as possible is part of an overall strategy for a progessive social and economic agenda. In an ideal world, this would have come from the Labour party, as this would overcome the substantial barriers to entry for new parties, particularly under First Past the Post. Owen Smith seemed to recognise this opportunity in 2016, and if Cooper had done so in 2015, we may have been living in a different world. But if needs be, the conditions are there for someone else to fill this gap. The reasons are as follows:

 1. There is considerably more space for an explicit call for a higher level of government expenditure and greater fiscal flexibility about how to finance it. The case for fiscal tightening in 2010 always had strong opposition from what is likely the majority of macro economists, but what economic case there was for fiscal tightening has largely collapsed. The most credible piece of research used by proponents of fiscal tightening was the now infamous Growth in a Time of Debt, better known by its authors, Reinhardt- Rogoff. The specifically British case for austerity was based on the supposition that capacity in the financial sector and the resulting revenue would permanently be lost due to the financial crisis. This has not materialised, and the bout of inflation in 2010-2012 used as evidence for this thesis has proven short lived and due to external factors. A party now in favour of expansionary fiscal policy would have an enourmous amount of support from policy experts as well as many in the private sector.

2. The Conservatives have burned any reputation they previously had for economic competence with Brexit and its handling. This may never have been deserved in the first place, but the point this reputation has now been lost. There is potentially a huge amount of support from businesses for a party that wants to prevent the enourmous costs of Brexit to the private sector, and they are likely willing to be a bit more forgiving of larger government expenditure than they would like, particularly if it is partly funded through deficit financing for longer term infrustructure projects which raise tax revenue over time, i.e which don't involve large tax hikes.

3. Labour under Corbyn have tried to capitalise from point 2. but their success will always be limited by the perception that they are anti-business and ultimately want to confiscate assetts. Whatever views may be held about whether people should think in this way, the fact is that they do. An alternative party or alternative leadership could propose a manifesto similar to Labour's in 2017 while dumping the rhetoric of revolutionary socialism, which is itself of questionable meaning anyway. This would avoid the divisiveness and widely held suspicion of that brand of politics, while still allowing the advocacy of a social democratic platform which after 9 years of austerity likely has wide appeal. The Liberal Democrats and any other potential pro European party (or Labour under a different leadership) would find it hard to capitalise solely on Brexit without being able to offer tangible improvements in living standards, social services and the interests of specific voters which require the willingness to spend more money. This is why the TIGgers aren’t going anywhere fast, but something else might.

4. The Labour leadership's prevaracation on Brexit, and more recently on Freedom of Movement has lead to Corbyn taking a big hit from the progressive left. Freedom of movement and the liberal internationalism it represents are of huge value to progressively minded voters, and standing up for these would present an enourmous opportunity nity for a political movement in a time where the perception of being pricinpled is an enormous assett.

5. As noted by a recent article in The Economist, the conditions are there for a large grass roots support for such a movement. While it is true that some of the more divisive aspects of Corbynism (e.g those mentioned in point 3.) are also of major appeal to some activists, there is a large body of other potential activists who would be there for the taking by a pro-european party with some realistic chance of success. The size of the People's Vote march on March 23rd (even if the numbers were a fair bit lower than 1 million) bears testament to this.


These points may well suffer from a large defect. There is a tendency in political analysis to equate what you want personally with what is politically astute, and perhaps I am falling into this trap here. It is also true that this analysis is somewhat utopian. The individuals with the capacity and possible inclination to lead such a movement, such as the members of TIG, seem more inclined towards vacuous statements of seriouness on economic affairs, and still do not properly seem to have understood why austerity is both politically and economically damaging. But if I'm only half delusional in the analysis, the opportunity seems there for the taking. 

Misunderstanding Germany

"Within minutes of a vote for Brexit the CEO’s of Mercedes, BMW, VW and Audi will be knocking down Chancellor Merkel’s door demanding that there be no barriers to German access to the British market." David Davis, 04/02/16

David Davis's now infamous claim that German car manufacturers would provide the silver bullet in Brexit negotiations for the UK has become the subject of much ridicule. But he was not alone in making it. As Chris Grey writes here, this claim was made by the leading donor to Vote Leave, by the campaigning group Out Means Out, and in my limited experience leafletting for remain the idea had real purchase with voters. And it is deeply revealing that it should have been so popular a belief amongst leading Brexit campaigners. For all the obsession with the EU, and Germany's role in the EU specifically, they have showed remarkably little interest in how Germany actually works, and in the dominant themes of recent German history, politics and society.  If they had done so, they would have immediately known how ridiculous a notion this was. 
Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer

European integration and Atlanticism have provided the overriding diplomatic framework for West Germany and later the united Germany after the second world war. This is not just a story about economics. In the aftermath of the horrors of the war, it was widely recognised by the German political class that the only way a German state would be accepted as a legitimate actor on the international scene was as part of a European alliance. It was the only legitimate vehicle for German interests and foreign policy objectives, and the only way Germans could legitimately conceive of their national identity as a subject of pride. The so called 'Stunde Null' or hour zero, on 8th of May, 1945 had to mark the start of something very different from what had occurred before. This notion was, on one level, ridiculous.  There was unsurprisingly a large element of continuity in the state and economy economy in the immediate years that followed the creation of the West German state in 1949¹, and change on a societal level was a gradual process, and the subject of generational conflict². But for the notion to have any reality at all, Germany and Germans fundamentally had to re-conceive their own national identity as part of a wider European story, in which Germans would be not just German, but European citizens. If this sounds like a facile overgeneralisation, it probably is, and I suspect it is also an overly teleological account of the story. But as crude generalisations go, I think this is roughly right. 

When the referendum result came in, there was a real disappointment to be seen in the German press, as the UK had been a large part of this vision of European integration and the Atlantic alliance. Moreover, British culture has real purchase in Germany. When we see the front page of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung comparing the House of Commons to a Monty Python sketch, what's interesting is not just the ridicule, but the fact that a Monty Python reference means something to a German audience. This disappointment may have been real, but would ultimately always come second to the broader goal of protecting the overall project of European cooperation and integration. To do otherwise would go against pretty much all of German foreign policy since 1949. And even in terms of raw economic cynicism, the calculation was quite different to the one many British commentators thought it was. Yes, British consumers buy a lot of German cars. But ultimately, efforts that undermined the integrity and functioning of the single market were believed to be vastly more significant in their economic impact on Germany. 

The only real point of evidence to the contrary Brexiteers had was the case of the Greek sovereign debt crisis³. Didn't the German government play hardball in order to protect the balance sheets of German banks? I think even here, British commentators have largely misread the situation. The response of the German (and French) government was indeed hugely damaging to Greece, and perhaps born of a misunderstanding of the effects of fiscal austerity on the Greek economy. As someone who has admired Angela Merkel for her actions on refugees, the humanitarian consequences of the terms of Greek loans have been a major source of dismay and perhaps even some cognitive dissonance on my part. But here too, in understanding motivation (if not in defending action) it is important to see that the perception of many German politicians was that a loosening of fiscal rules would undermine the integrity of the eurozone. It was also borne of the fact that to do so would have been seen as a betrayal of the then Spanish and Irish governments, who would have not have been able to defend their own policies to a domestic audience.  This may have been mistaken, and was certainly damaging, but it was not simply a case of the German government ignoring European interests for national ones. 

In the case of Brexit, we now know just how ridiculous Davis's claims were. But frankly, we should always have done so. This lack of knowledge or interest in the domestic politics of other European countries has been a major disadvantage to the British in negotiations. It is mirrored by the repeated bad faith claims made to the British press about post negotiation intentions. It is as if because they have no interest in European domestic politics and never read a German newspaper, they assume German politicians are equally ignorant and uninterested in British politics. On some level, this is perhaps the curse of English being the world's lingua franca. We do not appreciate just how much more ignorant we are of the affairs of other EU countries than many are of our own. But whatever happens with Brexit, if the UK is to go into future negotiations with some chance of a decent outcome, this has to change. Britian's political leaders need to start showing an actual interest in the subject they claim to be obsessed with. 

¹ Kiesinger, the third Chancellor of West Germany had himself been a member of the NSDAP, many firms which had done well under National Socialism continued to do so in the post war era
² The 1968 student protests in West Germany focussed, amongst other things, on former members of the NSDAP continuing to hold academic posts in universities
³ This was always an odd example, as it would hardly bode well for the UK

Transient Theories of Legitimacy and the Remain Paradox


Chris Dillow wrote an interesting piece the other day arguing that political beliefs and preferences are often transient affairs.  We tend to dramatically overstate the extent to which our own opinions are consistent over time, and the search for consistency might well turn out to be counterproductive and delusional. I would be tempted to go even further than this: a lot of the time, what we call beliefs, preferences and opinions do not even exist as things subject to change, their existence does not go beyond their contextual expression.  We do not consciously hold a belief, we are merely so disposed that certain situations will illicit a belief, perhaps momentary, perhaps of lasting effect. The set of questions we will at any point have consciously reflected upon is finite and not coextensive with the set questions that will become contextually relevant in the course of our lives. This is true of any of us. How we respond may be contextually determined. Sometimes this is perfectly appropriate. A teacher’s attitude towards a good teaching style will be a response to educational institutions as they actually exist, in the social context they exist. But they will tend to be believed as if they represented universal truths, rather than contextually specific ones.  Sometimes, on the other hand, what we see is not situational propriety but contradictions. It is, for example, a well known result in experimental economics that people will respond differently to an equivalent trade off depending on whether it is interpreted as an exercise in minimizing loss or maximizing gain, even when the outcomes are logically equivalent.  It is equally well known fact about opinion polling that contradictory results can be achieved by how a question is framed.



Theories of political legitimacy almost certainly fall into that category of things most of us do not have fully fleshed out opinions on. Only a fairly odd bunch of people have spent too much time examining or attempting to develop theoretical justifications for a political system, and it is questionable how useful a thing such an exercise really is. It is not surprising that in the aftermath of the 2016 referendum, the dominant response was to accept the fundamental legitimacy of the process. Brexit was what most people voted for, and the majority wins.

It’s tempting to see this as an absolutist position, but in reality it almost certainly isn’t held as such. There are plenty of situations in which very few people would evaluate the legitimacy of a course of action in this way. They might be more inclined to see a certain course of action as immoral. Or, in the event that they are personally adversely affected by a decision taken by a majority, they might see it as a violation of rights. In other circumstances the requirement of consent might be key.

And sometimes, the dominant way of thinking about a situation changes as circumstances change. In the case of Brexit, at the point where public opinion on the topic is relatively static, the view that a majority decision must be implemented is natural enough, and it may well be expressed as an absolutist position. But if public opinion changes significantly, other questions seem more natural. We might instead ask if previous decisions should be binding and whether democracy must allow for changes in mind. The point is not that it is impossible to try and reconcile these two views, or base a constitutional order on whatever synthesis emerges. The point is that most people simply do not ever do so. That is not a slight on them. My own experience of political philosophy has led me to the conclusion that it is largely a waste of time, but that may well be another kind of self delusion – I was never personally particularly good at it.

For remain campaigners this last point is quite significant. Since the 2016 referendum, actually convincing people that remaining is in fact a good idea has been a second order question. Before that could be effective, they have had to try and convince people that this is now a legitimate question to ask, given that the referendum happened. The problem is, the question only becomes one which is likely to be seen as legitimate after a change in public opinion. From the perspective of remainers, this is a kind of bad equilibrium. Public opinion can’t shift until the question is taken as a legitimate one, and the question won’t be seen as legitimate until there has been a shift in public opinion. Like many bad equilibria, random exogenous changes can sometimes, eventually, kick things in the right direction anyway. Eventually the storm might pass, and the ocean will be flat again. Public opinion does indeed seem to have started to shift, and new transient notions of legitimacy are springing up. This might well have happened too late in the day, though.

Structural causes of the radicalisation of Brexit

A few weeks ago I wrote a post arguing that since the referendum, Brexit had been subject to a process of increasing and self reinforcing radicalisation. Some of the ideas I think require some further clarification, so I thought I would collect them here in what is hopefully a clearer form. By radicalisation of Brexit, I refer both to the objectives and policy demands associated with Brexit, and the tone, rhetorical style and surrounding political and ideological tropes. On a policy level this means the fact that many Brexiteers demand not just an end of single market membership, but a default on international legal obligations to achieve it (terminating article 50 negotiations without a mechanism for preserving the Good Friday Agreement, failing to pay existing obligations to the EU etc). On a rhetorical/ideological level, I am primarily referring to the evocation of a notion of democracy which is ultra majoritarian and rejects any form of constitutionalism or democratic pluralism which might get in the way as treasonous, be it parliamentary scrutiny, supreme court rulings, the findings of the electoral commission etc. I wish specifically to argue that a large part of the explanation for this is structural and to do with the nature of the referendum, its legal status and its tensions with parliamentary democracy. This is not to say other factors are not also in play, but I wanted to focus here on these particular points, as I have not seen a fully fleshed out discussion the interplay of these factors with one another elsewhere, even though the individual points are not particularly original. The factors identified are as follows:

1. The referendum had very little legal status, beyond being advisory. It was won, but without support from the majority of MPs, or the then government. Implementation, because of its complexity and the absence of a defined legal mechanism beyond parliamentary and executive initiative, required some level of active support from people who had seen no new reason to like the policy. This damaged the traditional separation of liking a result and respecting its legitimacy. As Ken Clarke noted, normally an MP of the losing party in a general election can respect its outcome, with all the constitutional consequences which follow, without having to now agree or even acquiesce to the policies of the new government. With Brexit that was simply not possible. Many MPs saw the only way of solving this difficulty as a form of self censorship.

2.  Given point (1) it was strategically necessary for Brexiteers to attempt to delegitimise opposition to Brexit. The absence of a legal mechanism compelling implementation of the referendum result meant that Brexiteers assessed, quite rationally, that Brexit could only be guaranteed if support for it did not wane, and opposition did not grow. This made the delegitimisation of opposition a key strategic goal, achieved by calling opponents traitors or undemocratic. Their assessment that opponents were trying to reverse the referendum outcome was not wrong, but the means by which they attempted to prevent this was an assault on democratic pluralism, and later on constitutional constraints (e.g judges ruling in favour of Gina Miller).

3. The positive proposition (leaving the EU) was neither proposed by the government nor an opposition party, but instead a campaign group with no political accountability after the referendum. Support for leaving was from a diverse group of people with diverse and contradictory motivations. Vote Leave judged (correctly) that the best strategy for winning was to gloss over these, rather than making explicit policy choices. This meant that after the referendum result, interpretation of what the result should mean was a matter of ex post facto rationalisation.

4. Because we tend to make sense of policies as having reasons behind them, or fulfilling a purpose, the most natural ex post facto rationalisation of Brexit would involve policy choices which satisfied at least some of the most vocal (and radical) proponents.  This meant that Brexiteers would have a natural advantage in setting the tone of what 'counted' as a Brexit, and what the motivations for it were. This is not the same as achieving something with majority support, as these key proponents may well represent the radical wing, and even if they represent the majority of Brexit voters, a majority of a majority does not imply the majority of a whole. Being able to define what counted as Brexit went further than having a platform for being able to argue a particular outcome was good. It allowed Brexiteers to define the criteria by which Brexit was evaluated, and dismiss other criteria, or questions about whether the policy as a whole was a good idea, as illegitimate.

5. These Brexiteers have also largely been competing to come out well in any potential leadership contest within the Conservative Party. This gives a huge premium to those who make radical proposals, given the preferences of the party membership. This premium is further aggravated by the fact that extreme positions attract media attention, and outright displays of bellicose behaviour play well in culture war type disputes. In order to prove ones credentials as the true messenger of Brexit, Brexiteers have competed to outdo each other on their radicalism.

6. The logic of the Single Market and Customs Union does not allow for any of the substantial promises of Vote Leave to be kept without a radical break with the single market. Whether or not this is a good idea is not the point, as this is no longer the relevant criteria for deciding policy (see point (4). Since the criterion used to evaluate withdrawal is whether it 'counts' as Brexit, rather than being sound policy, it does not matter any more how damaging leaving the single market is.

7. The only way of preserving the large coalition in favour of Brexit despite its contradictions is to coalesce around purely negative propositions (no deal, voting against the government) etc. This also has the benefit of avoiding any of the consequences of any positive proposition, which given the realities of the options available will be politically toxic whatever that positive proposition happens to be.

8. Given points 1 and 5-7, any deal or course of action supported by Brexiteers could never command the support of the House of Commons. The response of Brexiteers, therefore, has been to attempt not just to delegitimise opposition to Brexit, but Parliament as an institution. This, and the institutions of representative democracy more generally, are now taken as superseded as sources of legitimate political power by what is taken to be an expression of 'the will of the people'.

Any comments on further possible structural factors are most welcome.


Article 50 Extension Day

It was a sultry day on June 29th, 2051. The air conditioners were on full blast throughout the newly opened Elizabeth Line, as a certain Mr M. emerged from the escalators. Checking his phone, he looked anxiously to see if there was any signal as he approached the faint smog of the street.

Despite his personal role in the procedure, Mr M had as little interest as anybody else in the day's formalities. Article 50 Extension Day was more of a national embarrassment than a festivity, but in true British style, the peculiar customs were kept to in a rigid fashion, in an almost ceremonial way.

Today, however, something quite strange was afoot. Rumours had been circulating MyNews that the parliamentary lobbies were fuller than expected. Today's proceedings were, after all, by custom, only attended by cabinet ministers and a sole representative of the opposition. But there was no denying it: the Malthouse Loyalist Wing were there, in full force, and now photographic evidence had emerged to prove it. "What are they up to? Surely," Mr M asked himself, "there must be a reasonable explanation." But reasonable explanations rarely helped much with the Malthouse Loyalists. It was exactly what Mr M, the then Prime Minister of the National Government, and leader of the Labour party had feared.

Frantic phone calls were made. Members of Parliament were instructed to return at all costs. "For God's sake! Yes, yes, I know that's the custom, but they've showed up this time! There must be 50 of them, and without any support, they've got the numbers to scupper it!".

But it was no use. Most MPs were on holiday, or in their constituencies, and time was short. The only hope was the London MPs of the opposition Socialist Party, but they were in no mood to bail out a Prime Minister from a party which in their view was illegitimately usurping the Labour name, and in coalition with the Tories, no less. Perhaps a few would turn up, but without the support of the whip, who could say if it would be enough?

The ceremony began as it always did, with the Prime Minister speaking at the podium. "No deal is better than a bad deal, and we intend to leave the European Union by the end of the month!", he announced. The words had meant something once, like when the King is said to have been asked to dissolve Parliament for a general election, but now they may as well have been Latin.  "But," said the sole member of the opposition, "we have not made adequate preparation! I therefore propose to the House that a request be submitted to the European Union asking for a two year extension!" The ceremony could not easily be delayed, and it continued as if nothing was the matter. A now authentically old Rees Mogg smiled from the back benches, filled with his 50 or so allies sitting behind the cabinet ministers in an otherwise empty chamber. He displayed his iconic wry smile, and, turning to his neighbour, whispered "I think we've done it!" Or at least, that is what the parliamentary lip readers would later report.

But events would have it otherwise. Filing in, at just the last moment, were the 30 or so members of the Socialist Party needed to pass the extension bill. Nobody knows for certain what caused their change of heart, but it is strongly suspected that it might have had something to do with the National Government's renewed efforts at nationalising the railway lines, excluding of course, the Inter-City Maglev. Or perhaps that was an afterthought, a kind of token of thanks from the National Government to the Socialists. One thing which was beyond dispute was the changing character of Extension Day. Everyone agreed that parliamentary attendance in all future ceremonies would have to be mandatory.


Failing to try, or trying to fail?


Well, they certainly are cutting it fine, aren’t they? With about 2 weeks until the article 50 deadline, nothing has been agreed in parliament, and the default remains no deal. Later today, MPs will likely vote en masse against this option, in principle, but with nothing of substance to change the fact that it is ultimately still the default option. They just aren’t trying hard, are they? Or maybe they are indeed trying, just trying to fail.

Since the start the start of the article 50 process, the main driver of for MPs of all parties and factions, with the exception of May and her loyalists, has been to avoid responsibility for whatever happens next. This makes a lot of sense, as all the options are toxic politically. Labour MPs, particularly in leave seats, are worried (perhaps mistakenly) about alienating leave voters, but they also know the majority of their voters and members do not like Brexit at all. For the Labour leadership and a large part of the parliamentary party, the preferred option is for May’s deal to pass, but without their own support. As Owen Jones put it, what they really want is for the Tories to own the consequences of Brexit, but without actively supporting anything else. They will therefore continue to vote against anything of substance which could pass a vote in commons, in the belief that this means whatever happens next they will have opposed it. In order to negate the claim that this ultimately allowed the actual outcome, they will continue to support certain quasi substantive motions only upon the condition that they cannot possibly pass in the House of Commons. Corbyn will put forth his alternative Brexit bill a second time, it will fail a second time, and he might even try another vote of no confidence. 
The ERG’s motivations are a little more varied, but with some overlaps.  A few may genuinely want no deal as an outcome. They know that this is still the default option, and may be willing to take a gamble on the MPs failing to coalesce around an alternative. However insane the desire for no deal, it is not an irrational strategy for obtaining it, given what we have seen of the behaviour of MPs over the last 2 years. For others, it is simply about positioning themselves in line with the 57% of Conservative Party members who prefer no deal to anything else. For them, the ideal outcome to have supported no deal and failed to achieve this outcome. This way, they get to position themselves as the true Brexit believers, without actually having to face up to the consequences of no deal. The problem is they are now dangerously close to actually achieving this outcome, which is where the Malthouse Compromise comes in: they will claim this represented a substantial policy contribution which could have made no deal work, and blame the actual disaster on the failure of parliament to support it. When parliament votes against no deal in principle, this will be used as evidence that if it does happen, it was not done with proper gusto. They will therefore have failed to achieve what they claimed would make the policy workable, and content themselves with a no deal by default, the consequences of which will be blamed on others.

Unfortunately, all other things being equal, both groups will succeed. Whatever happens next, they will not have supported it, and have failed to achieve their alternative. This will not be a happy outcome, to say the least.