The political case for liberal Keynesianism

A number of commentators have said that there is a gaping hole in the centre of British politics, waiting to be filled by a credible political party without the historical baggage of the Liberal Democrats. Definitional questions of centrism notwithstanding, I don't think this is quite right. The big space waiting to be filled in British politics is for a party willing to stand on a progressive, pro-european, Keynesian platform. It would highlight the horrendous social consequences of fiscal tightening on social expenditure, but also make a robust case for an expansive fiscal policy as economically credible. It would stand on an explicitly pro-european platform, but incorporate that into a story about how remaining in the EU, or at least the single market, and preserving the institutional framework for European cooreration as much as possible is part of an overall strategy for a progessive social and economic agenda. In an ideal world, this would have come from the Labour party, as this would overcome the substantial barriers to entry for new parties, particularly under First Past the Post. Owen Smith seemed to recognise this opportunity in 2016, and if Cooper had done so in 2015, we may have been living in a different world. But if needs be, the conditions are there for someone else to fill this gap. The reasons are as follows:

 1. There is considerably more space for an explicit call for a higher level of government expenditure and greater fiscal flexibility about how to finance it. The case for fiscal tightening in 2010 always had strong opposition from what is likely the majority of macro economists, but what economic case there was for fiscal tightening has largely collapsed. The most credible piece of research used by proponents of fiscal tightening was the now infamous Growth in a Time of Debt, better known by its authors, Reinhardt- Rogoff. The specifically British case for austerity was based on the supposition that capacity in the financial sector and the resulting revenue would permanently be lost due to the financial crisis. This has not materialised, and the bout of inflation in 2010-2012 used as evidence for this thesis has proven short lived and due to external factors. A party now in favour of expansionary fiscal policy would have an enourmous amount of support from policy experts as well as many in the private sector.

2. The Conservatives have burned any reputation they previously had for economic competence with Brexit and its handling. This may never have been deserved in the first place, but the point this reputation has now been lost. There is potentially a huge amount of support from businesses for a party that wants to prevent the enourmous costs of Brexit to the private sector, and they are likely willing to be a bit more forgiving of larger government expenditure than they would like, particularly if it is partly funded through deficit financing for longer term infrustructure projects which raise tax revenue over time, i.e which don't involve large tax hikes.

3. Labour under Corbyn have tried to capitalise from point 2. but their success will always be limited by the perception that they are anti-business and ultimately want to confiscate assetts. Whatever views may be held about whether people should think in this way, the fact is that they do. An alternative party or alternative leadership could propose a manifesto similar to Labour's in 2017 while dumping the rhetoric of revolutionary socialism, which is itself of questionable meaning anyway. This would avoid the divisiveness and widely held suspicion of that brand of politics, while still allowing the advocacy of a social democratic platform which after 9 years of austerity likely has wide appeal. The Liberal Democrats and any other potential pro European party (or Labour under a different leadership) would find it hard to capitalise solely on Brexit without being able to offer tangible improvements in living standards, social services and the interests of specific voters which require the willingness to spend more money. This is why the TIGgers aren’t going anywhere fast, but something else might.

4. The Labour leadership's prevaracation on Brexit, and more recently on Freedom of Movement has lead to Corbyn taking a big hit from the progressive left. Freedom of movement and the liberal internationalism it represents are of huge value to progressively minded voters, and standing up for these would present an enourmous opportunity nity for a political movement in a time where the perception of being pricinpled is an enormous assett.

5. As noted by a recent article in The Economist, the conditions are there for a large grass roots support for such a movement. While it is true that some of the more divisive aspects of Corbynism (e.g those mentioned in point 3.) are also of major appeal to some activists, there is a large body of other potential activists who would be there for the taking by a pro-european party with some realistic chance of success. The size of the People's Vote march on March 23rd (even if the numbers were a fair bit lower than 1 million) bears testament to this.


These points may well suffer from a large defect. There is a tendency in political analysis to equate what you want personally with what is politically astute, and perhaps I am falling into this trap here. It is also true that this analysis is somewhat utopian. The individuals with the capacity and possible inclination to lead such a movement, such as the members of TIG, seem more inclined towards vacuous statements of seriouness on economic affairs, and still do not properly seem to have understood why austerity is both politically and economically damaging. But if I'm only half delusional in the analysis, the opportunity seems there for the taking. 

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