This remark is an extreme example of something all too visible: the radicalisation of some Brexiteers, both in tone and content. Victory must be total and metaphorically violent. We see this in the description of MPs as traitors and the demand for a 'no deal' resolution to article 50 negotiations. And it has not gone at all unnoticed how different these demands are to what was said in the referendum campaign.
How did we get here? If we start with the shift in goals, one way of explaining this is a thesis popularised by James O'brien: the movement towards 'no deal' is essentially about avoiding having to give any specific plans about what to do next. A variant on this would be to say that the varying and contradictory demands of Brexiteers could ultimately only coalesce around a negative proposition. A third alternative would be to see the shift as intentional- 'no deal' could never be advocated in a campaign, but was the ultimate desired outcome, or at least the best way of achieving something akin to that as circumstances unraveled. I think these are important and persuasive, and to the extent that the third and first two propositions are contradictory, I suspect the third motivation is less at work. What, I think, they miss, is another, completely different element at work: the self reinforcing radicalisation of Brexiteers in their outlook and attitude.
For this process of psychological and rhetorical radicalisation to make sense to make sense, we have to understand two central mechanism: firstly, the logic of implementation, given the way the referendum was set up, and secondly, the peculiar dynamics of the so called Brexit culture war.
The first point is quite simple. The 2016 referendum had no legal status beyond being advisory. Leave won, but without the support of the then government, or the majority of MPs, or any mechanism for these two facts to automatically change. There was no constitutional guide as to what should happen next, it was all a matter of extra-legal interpretation of what ought to (or what was good politics). Brexiteers were well aware of this, and correctly, or at least rationally, assessed that Brexit could only occur if both MPs and a large chunk of the public continued to believe that it ought to. This meant that the traditional separation of respecting the legitimacy of process and the correctness of the decision somewhat vanished. Provided it could be contemplated that Brexit would not be implemented, or not implemented as desired, if opinion changed, continuing to argue Brexit was a bad idea could indeed potentially have undermined the result. It was not like a general election, where it is easy to subscribe to the validity of the process without liking the outcome. The complexity of the decision and the need for continual and active involvement of those who instinctively did not like it fundamentally blurred this distinction. A key strategic requirement for Brexiteers in this context was to delegitimise opposition. It was this need, as much as the atmosphere of the time, which sowed the seeds of claims that opponents of Brexit were traitors.
The absence of legal parameters also fundamentally changed the accepted criteria for success. Leave got away without precisely defining what Brexit should mean, and once they won, definition was a retroactive activity. Hardliners were always going to be in a position to claim to be the authentic voices of what Brexit was about. Once the settled metric for deciding what Brexit should mean was retroactively asking ‘what is most in keeping with the rationale for voting leave?’, this set in motion a competitive process for finding the most extreme and uncompromising definition, which would naturally seem most authentic. This was not helped by the reality of the available options for leaving, which did not allow for any of the substantive content of the campaign to be implemented without a radical break from the single market. And once the debate became about the correct interpretation of leavers’ rationale for Brexit, whether achieving these goals was worth it, a good idea, or in fact insane became a second order question at best, and indeed an illegitimate one for hardliners.
The absence of legal parameters also fundamentally changed the accepted criteria for success. Leave got away without precisely defining what Brexit should mean, and once they won, definition was a retroactive activity. Hardliners were always going to be in a position to claim to be the authentic voices of what Brexit was about. Once the settled metric for deciding what Brexit should mean was retroactively asking ‘what is most in keeping with the rationale for voting leave?’, this set in motion a competitive process for finding the most extreme and uncompromising definition, which would naturally seem most authentic. This was not helped by the reality of the available options for leaving, which did not allow for any of the substantive content of the campaign to be implemented without a radical break from the single market. And once the debate became about the correct interpretation of leavers’ rationale for Brexit, whether achieving these goals was worth it, a good idea, or in fact insane became a second order question at best, and indeed an illegitimate one for hardliners.
The second point has to do with the dynamics of culture wars. By accident or intent, Brexit has become a focal point of general cultural tensions between liberalism and social conservatism. Very few people on either side are much interested in the complexities of how the EU functions, and to some extent support or opposition is a proxy for indicating general political outlook. This has, one way or another, led to the belief that somehow these differences will be resolved by one side 'winning' or 'losing' the dispute, when democratic politics should on some level be about compromise. Both leavers and remainers see an urgency to this, and for both it is about loss. Remainers are worried about the demise of liberalism, this fear extenuated by comparisons of right wing populism to inter-war fascist movements. For the Brexiteers, it is about the perceived slow loss of social conservatism to progressivism, and the loss of status of social conservatives in the media and broader society.
Political mobilisation in this environment is most easily achieved by appealing to the tropes of this culture war. This sets in motion a process of cumulative radicalisation. Previously outlandish ideas and rhetorical frames of reference become normalised, and convictions are made ever more solid. The need to continuously excite the passions of radicalised supporters, as well as the desire for attention it satisfies, demands ever more outlandish ideas. And the perceived radicalism of political opponents makes the desire for victory more vivid and more totalising in nature.
This is quite a disturbing thing to witness, and it is easy to lose sight of how quickly this has occurred. Fortunately these ostentatious displays of fanaticism probably do not play well beyond certain core audiences, and I suspect ultimately makes bad politics. And more fortunately still, the UK remains a country where democratic politics is the only means whereby this fanaticism can achieve power. But I do not find this more than a partial comfort.
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