Brexit: a policy without qualities


As James O'Brien observes, one of the many oddities about Brexit is its proponents more or less categorically refuse to define its meaning clearly in anything other than negative terms. Indeed he argues (I think correctly) that the ERG's eventual movement to favouring 'no deal' is the ultimate expression of a desire to avoid any concrete policy proposals. 
How did we get here? The ignorance of leading Brexiteers of the key issues is well known, and surely part of the story. This is at times even celebrated as either a virtue, or proof of argument. This clip of two well-known Brexiteers is a recent example. In it, Kate Hoey claims that her own ignorance of the EU is an argument for Brexit, while David Davis implies in his remarks that his ignorance some kind of proof of authenticity and ultimately authority. These particular individuals are by no means alone in making this kind of argument.
This has frequently been compared to other right wing populist movements, and not without reason. Ian Dunt, a commentator I have a lot of time for, argues here that this is the key analogue between Brexit and Trumpism. This comparison amongst other things also helps make sense of the anti-elite rhetoric behind right wing populists. If the term elite is more about education and profession than wealth or power, then it makes sense that the leaders of these movements could be wealthy individuals whose explicit appeal is lacking any particular expertise. It equally makes sense that this would go hand in hand with a rejection of institutional rationality and the rule of law and the desire to replace these with common sense action. A movement of this sort would unsurprisingly not be too keen on content. 
But beyond this, I think there are specific reasons why Brexit is liable this kind of content vacuity. As has been frequently observed, this is partly due to the way the referendum was set up. The referendum was advisory, and the absence of any legal requirement for implementation meant nobody had to define what implementing it meant. Indeed Vote Leave made it a strategy to exploit this flaw. As Tony Yates writes here, there were inherent tensions in Brexit supporters as a group, some favouring Brexit for the sake of deregulation, some favouring national isolation.
Crucially, the nature of the question itself allowed for this ambiguity. Taken literally, ‘leaving the EU’ means leaving an institutional and legal structure for upholding various arrangements and treaties. Since it is always possible to imagine a different institutional and legal structure doing analogous things, it is always strictly logically possible to advocate Brexit without opposing any specific function of the EU. So whenever a proponent of Brexit wishes to dismiss a possible consequence of leaving, there is always the retort that such a consequence can be avoided by setting up a (typically unspecified) method of achieving the same result. Of course, this should not be a very convincing kind of argument (why leave then? Shouldn’t the case for Brexit then be about the efficacy of the legal mechanism, not the principle? How is this reconcilable with any of the objectives of Brexit, which do presuppose substantial change?), but the inherent problems in the argument are too difficult to pick apart in short TV exchanges.
If this idea seems a little abstract, imagine the following analogy. A future British government decides to hold a referendum on withdrawing from NATO. The campaign supporting withdrawal talks about supposed infringements on sovereignty of the 2% defence target, mutual defence etc, but whenever they are pressed on the risks of leaving these concerns are batted away. “We could easily have mutual defence pacts outside of NATO with other NATO members. And why would those members be so irrational as to refuse our offer? They seem to want our cooperation now.”
This is one of the fundamental problems with discussions about Brexit. It is unclear whether what is being discussed is the actual content of arrangements between Britain and the rest of the EU, or the enforcement mechanisms behind those arrangements. Either are, at least in the abstract, possible to discuss. But it is not possible to have a discussion about Brexit as a course of action unless it is clear which of the two it is about. The philosopher John Searle argued that a large part of social and political reality is ontologically subjective. It exists in the way it does because it is collectively held as doing so. Bits of paper with pictures of the queen are money because we all hold them to be. What we have here is a large scale case of an aspect of social reality with conflicting ideas not just about what it means, but on a very basic level what kind of a concept we are dealing with. It is unsurprising that such a conflict should generate so much chaos, though there are plenty of other reasons for that too.





Blairite historical materialism


A recent blog post by Chris Dillow on the idea of conservative Marxism reminded me of a thought I’ve had kicking around for a while: if we separate Marxism as a analytic framework from particular normative commitments, its influence and analogues are not always found where you would expect them to be.

There has been an extraordinary volume of literature on the question of what Marxism as an analytic framework really is.  Raymond Geuss tries to trace a series of distinct traditions, each drawing on different aspects of Marx’s work: one which stresses Marx as an economic thinker, one which sees Marx as a humanist primarily focused on the idea of alienation, and one the historical materialist interpretation, which sees him as primarily interested in analysing historical processes. As Geuss himself stresses, these debates have a habit of presupposing that there is some coherent whole to be discovered, and that this whole constitutes some totalising theory of some aspect of society or human nature, rather than a set of ideas and remarks, some containing the odd useful concept or two, some less so. At its worst, this tendency extends to arguing about what the true idea of Marxism is, which simultaneously refers to what Marx really thought and what should be believed about the world generally. This odd tendency of responses to Marx as a thinker* has an obvious political dimension dimension to it, though less so since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Leaving this debate aside, the form of Marxism I want to focus on is the historical materialist interpretation. This takes as a starting point that society is structured around the particular modes of production, or ways of producing things. Roles in productive processes, including those of control or ownership give rise to social relationships. Gerry Cohen, who was a leading proponent of this school of thought, uses the analogy of a small village with a well. If the well were to provide not just drinking water but a means of irrigation, control of access to the well might well form the basis of social relations within the village. In Victorian England, the well is replaced with factories, and we have the familiar story of the bourgeoisie and proletariat, whose social status is essentially about relations of control and ownership of the means of production. In this school of thought, one of the key drivers of social change is technological. There is a certain set of possible relations given whatever particular technology is predominantly used, and these possibilities change as new technologies arise.  For any given set of social relations and any specific set of technologies, there is a fixed maximum level of human economic development. Old forms of organisation get swept aside when they prevent the exploitation of a new technology which might allow greater productive potential.

Let’s leave to one side for a moment the question of how plausible an account of society we find this. What interests me is where, in contemporary politics, we see something most akin to this kind of thought. The answer is quite a surprising one: not Jeremy Corbyn or, with some notable exceptions, the radical left, but from Tony Blair and what is sometimes called the neo-liberal centre.

To focus on Blair specifically, one idea he comes back to repeatedly is the idea of globalisation. This, in his view, is an unstoppable, technologically driven force, which drives social, economic and political change. It structures the possibilities of statecraft, and dictates the agency of individuals.


“Globalisation is not really a decision by government, it’s an unstoppable force that’s driven by technology, trade, travel, migration, and it’s going to carry on. However governments can respond to the stresses of it…. [the task is] to protect people from the risks and dangers of globalization, and allow them to access the benefits.” 


 “Some want a fortress Britain job protection pull up the drawbridghe get out of international engagements others see no option but to submit to global forces and let the strongest survive. Our answer has to be very clear. It is once again to help people through a changing world, by using collective power to advance opportunity and provide security for all… and the same global forces that are shaping business are at work in public services too.”

And, on the idea of social organisation and economic potential, he makes the following remarks in a 2005 party political broadcast:

“If we actually took human capital as the most precious resource of this country and we asked ‘how far are we from developing that human capital to its fullest extent?’, the answer would be ‘we have made progress, but there’s a massive amount still to do…” In order to do this we must “invest in the public sphere, whilst modernising it.”


In other words, the key drivers of social, political and economic change are technological. What policy makers can do is respond to these changes, as they in turn drive changes in potential forms of social organisation and human potential.  As Gordon Brown sees it, “the challenge is how Britain can be one of the great success stories in the next state global economy, and how every single citizen in Britain can have some benefit from that.” In Marx’s terms, it is to alleviate the "birth pangs"  of a new order. 

This leads us to a rather odd conclusion: for all the criticism of Corbyn as a Marxist, in many ways, his thinking is much more moralistic and much less Marxist than Tony Blair's. 

*The only other secular thinker I can think of who is subjected to this to the same extent is Sigmund Freud, though I'm sure there are others. 


Self Justifications

"Oh we, who wished to lay for the foundations for peace and friendliness, Could never be friendly ourselves." Brecht.

It is now almost a cliché to suggest that the Conservative Party is in the process of driving the country off a cliff in an attempt to preserve the unity of their own party.  The fanaticism of members of the ERG aside, it is quite a spectacle to behold the bulk of Conservative MPs, most of whom could easily get jobs elsewhere if they had to, prioritise party unity over anything else. The temptation is to see this as some kind of moral aberration explained only by sociopathic levels of self interest. But it's worth bearing in mind the remarkable human capacity to justify this self interest in moral terms.

Ruthless self promotion can always be justified morally by self belief. Once you believe your own talents are worthwhile and ultimately contribute to others, it is easy to justify self promotion as coextensive with the greater good. The same can equally be true of a political movement. And, of course, while the dangers of this pattern of thought are obvious, it is worth noting that there is nothing inherently false about this line of reasoning.

A Conservative MP might well reason along similar lines. From their perspective, the alternative to their own party being in government is a disaster. This is particularly pronounced at this moment in time, given their own beliefs about what a Corbyn government would entail. This belief may well be totally false, but the point rather is that the reasoning that follows from it is quite familiar in its form.

Moreover, from an individual perspective, the fanaticism of colleagues can easily accentuate the extent to which the maintenance of personal position is seen as necessary. I can only guess as to what goes on in Theresa May's or cabinet members' heads, but it is quite plausible they believe throwing everything else under the bus for the sake of self preservation is ultimately an act of altruism. What, they might ask, would happen, if the real fanatics took charge?

Hannah Arendt described such moral stories as a central element of totalitarian regimes. Once individual agency is taken as limited, the individual feels compelled to preserve their own position in such a system, justifying such apparent self interest with the idea that others would carry out similar tasks with less benevolence. If someone's gotta do it, it better be me. Indeed, the transgressive nature of the task at hand can merely contribute to the individual's sense of virtue. I am doing, so the reasoning goes, something I find difficult precisely because it is abhorrent, but in doing so I am ultimately serving a greater good by preventing a worse person doing the same. Because I find such a decision so difficult, I am therefore making a personal sacrifice in doing so.

Of course, the totalitarian analogy is an extreme one, and we are dealing with something dramatically less brutal. But that only serves to make this behaviour less surprising, not more so. Of course, this does not mean that such moral stories really are at work now. Perhaps we are in fact dealing with a more pedestrian variety of vanity and self interest. The problem is, the two are almost impossible to tell apart.

Are shifting attitudes the root of authoritarian populism?


"Revolutions erupt when a variety of often different resentments merge to assault an unsuspecting regime." Kissenger, World Order

When thinking about modern right wing populism, one of the first places to start might be looking at it as an ideology. Part of this might involve analysing the value sets it appeals to, who holds these and why. There is a temptation, therefore, to explain the rise of right wing populist movements in terms of how certain values became more prevalent, and why these might provide ‘fertile ground’ for them. This may well be part of the story. But it also may not.

In the British context, it doesn’t seem clear that the long-term trend of popular attitudes has been in this direction. Attitudes to migration and its salience have fluctuated, but the longer term trend over the last 50 years seems to have been towards greater tolerance. Anecdotally, at least, attitudes towards race seem to have become less essentialised and less tied up with notions of nationality or community. There are of course numerous other areas, particularly criminal justice, which I have not looked into, and it may well be therefore that in important areas this argument turns out to be wrong. The point is rather that it does not have to be wrong in order for successful nativist or right wing populist movements to be possible and have emerged recently.

These movements might, rather, be more symptomatic of the trouble established political parties find themselves in. Here there are long term and short term trends at work. The long term difficulties posed by de-industrialation and the decline of trade unions to social democratic parties is well understood. Indeed as early as 1994 Eric Hobsbawn argued that this would leave a void that might be filled by nativist and separatist movements. Added to this is the ideological crisis of the centre right after the collapse of the Soviet Block. If a large part of the appeal of the centre right was anti-communism, and this unfavourable comparison with the centrally planned socialism was a key justification for policy, these parties would naturally face difficulties when that threat receded.

Moreover, in the shorter term, the financial crisis and its mismanagement have likely profoundly destabilized mainstream political parties. This is partly the familiar story of discontent with low growth and wage stagnation making incumbents unpopular. But its also about the peculiar tendency of banking crises to accentuate the existing idea that powerful institutions are fundamentally corrupt. This both provides an opening for insurgents and deprives the key argument made against them of its saliency: that insurgent movements are incompetent and do not know how to run the machinery of the state. That machinery is itself seen as something corrupt and undesirable, and the competence of established political actors is called into question (often correctly) because of their failure to deliver improvements in living standards. There are also specific difficulties for social democratic parties since the financial crisis. The third way bargain of delivering increases in social expenditure without large scale redistribution was dependent on decent levels of growth. In a lower growth economy, more difficult decisions have to be made about how to deliver the improvements in living standards for the worse off without which the left has little appeal. Had social democratic parties responded to the financial crisis with more robust counter cyclical platforms, this may not have been the case. 

It is against this backdrop that insurgent movements finally have the critical mass of support required to gain traction with the wider electorate as viable political movements. It is unsurprising that those, which are successful, will appeal to popular ideas; some of these may be authoritarian populist. But this does not require that these ideas have become more prevalent, simply that they did not previously find political expression. Indeed, to some extent an animating feature of right wing populism is the fear that certain beliefs are on the decline. The moral panic about left wing student activism, social liberalism on the media and in education provide a sense of urgency of the mission to strike while the iron is hot, precisely because of a perception that in the long term such movements may not be viable.

What would this mean about the long term? This is less clear. Even if the long term trend were against authoritarian populist movements, short term disruptions can change the direction of travel. And perhaps the premises of the argument in this piece are wrong anyway. They certainly go against occum’s razor, the simplest argument being that changes in attitudes go alongside the popularity of movements which espouse them. But at least on an anecdotal level, it seems a thought worth entertaining.  

Can we please just revoke article 50 already?



May’s deal is terrible. Compared to remaining in the EU, it is economically harmful, reduces cooperation between the UK and other EU member states in many areas of life, including scientific and academic research, reduces the diplomatic clout of the all member states, particularly the UK and has no real upside. The positive case of further trade deals with non-EU states simply does not stack up: the UK would struggle to replicate relationships even close to as favourable as currently exist with non EU members, because of the terms of the withdrawal agreement and existing FTA’s between the EU and non EU states such deals would likely require regulatory alignment with the EU anyway, and, even if all this were not the case, economic gravity implies that any deal with the EU is far more important anyway.  The only ‘positive’ argument for May’s deal over and above EU membership is that may allow the UK to restrict free movement. The main problem with this argument is that there aren’t any real benefits to restricting free movement within the EU, just a large amount of extra economic pain, fewer personal opportunities, and a large dollop of gratuitous cruelty, particularly given the way such restrictions are likely to be implemented by a Conservative government.

The one remaining argument for May’s deal is increasingly her own: it’s that or no deal. I assume anyone reading this is already convinced that ‘no deal’ is unfathomably terrible, so it will suffice to say that it avoids none of the cruelty or long term badness of May’s deal, but with a lot more short term chaos. I suppose if the choice really is May’s deal or no deal, May’s deal is the only choice in town, being, unambiguously the lesser of two evils, albeit quite an evil evil to begin with.

The elephant in the room is obvious. Why not simply call the whole thing off? There is an answer to this, which is worth seriously considering. This is that it represents the best possible political compromise. It is not true, as some suggest, that such a compromise cannot represent a stable outcome simply because nobody would choose it above their preferred outcome. This is as, so the argument would go, neither side gets exactly what they want, but both sides get something better than their worst fear. There are then two strands to how this argument progresses.  The first is that the stability of a compromise- any compromise, is of value. It allows life to continue and future diplomatic and economic relations to be built. The second strand is political- only if both sides feel a compromise has been reached, and, leavers in particular feel the referendum result has been upheld, can a damaging narrative of betrayal be avoided. This modern Dolchstoßlegende,  so the argument goes, would feed the far right in an already precarious time.

The problem with this argument is it presupposes that leading Brexiteers do in fact see May’s deal as a worthwhile compromise. They do not.  They will cry betrayal regardless, just this time in the backdrop of a lot of economic pain and cruelty. Perhaps if they were rational and responsible they would value the stability of whatever outcome occurs over the prospect of winning a game of chicken, but the willingness of leading Brexiteers to advocate no deal, and indeed the whole Brexit episode itself, suggests this is not the case.

In what sense, then, does May’s deal represent a compromise? It is at best a compromise between remainers desires and their own, likely misplaced sense of obligation to see through the results of an extraordinarily problematic referendum. Unless the alternative really is no deal, this is not a road it makes any sense to go down. Let’s revoke article 50 already.