Brexit: a policy without qualities


As James O'Brien observes, one of the many oddities about Brexit is its proponents more or less categorically refuse to define its meaning clearly in anything other than negative terms. Indeed he argues (I think correctly) that the ERG's eventual movement to favouring 'no deal' is the ultimate expression of a desire to avoid any concrete policy proposals. 
How did we get here? The ignorance of leading Brexiteers of the key issues is well known, and surely part of the story. This is at times even celebrated as either a virtue, or proof of argument. This clip of two well-known Brexiteers is a recent example. In it, Kate Hoey claims that her own ignorance of the EU is an argument for Brexit, while David Davis implies in his remarks that his ignorance some kind of proof of authenticity and ultimately authority. These particular individuals are by no means alone in making this kind of argument.
This has frequently been compared to other right wing populist movements, and not without reason. Ian Dunt, a commentator I have a lot of time for, argues here that this is the key analogue between Brexit and Trumpism. This comparison amongst other things also helps make sense of the anti-elite rhetoric behind right wing populists. If the term elite is more about education and profession than wealth or power, then it makes sense that the leaders of these movements could be wealthy individuals whose explicit appeal is lacking any particular expertise. It equally makes sense that this would go hand in hand with a rejection of institutional rationality and the rule of law and the desire to replace these with common sense action. A movement of this sort would unsurprisingly not be too keen on content. 
But beyond this, I think there are specific reasons why Brexit is liable this kind of content vacuity. As has been frequently observed, this is partly due to the way the referendum was set up. The referendum was advisory, and the absence of any legal requirement for implementation meant nobody had to define what implementing it meant. Indeed Vote Leave made it a strategy to exploit this flaw. As Tony Yates writes here, there were inherent tensions in Brexit supporters as a group, some favouring Brexit for the sake of deregulation, some favouring national isolation.
Crucially, the nature of the question itself allowed for this ambiguity. Taken literally, ‘leaving the EU’ means leaving an institutional and legal structure for upholding various arrangements and treaties. Since it is always possible to imagine a different institutional and legal structure doing analogous things, it is always strictly logically possible to advocate Brexit without opposing any specific function of the EU. So whenever a proponent of Brexit wishes to dismiss a possible consequence of leaving, there is always the retort that such a consequence can be avoided by setting up a (typically unspecified) method of achieving the same result. Of course, this should not be a very convincing kind of argument (why leave then? Shouldn’t the case for Brexit then be about the efficacy of the legal mechanism, not the principle? How is this reconcilable with any of the objectives of Brexit, which do presuppose substantial change?), but the inherent problems in the argument are too difficult to pick apart in short TV exchanges.
If this idea seems a little abstract, imagine the following analogy. A future British government decides to hold a referendum on withdrawing from NATO. The campaign supporting withdrawal talks about supposed infringements on sovereignty of the 2% defence target, mutual defence etc, but whenever they are pressed on the risks of leaving these concerns are batted away. “We could easily have mutual defence pacts outside of NATO with other NATO members. And why would those members be so irrational as to refuse our offer? They seem to want our cooperation now.”
This is one of the fundamental problems with discussions about Brexit. It is unclear whether what is being discussed is the actual content of arrangements between Britain and the rest of the EU, or the enforcement mechanisms behind those arrangements. Either are, at least in the abstract, possible to discuss. But it is not possible to have a discussion about Brexit as a course of action unless it is clear which of the two it is about. The philosopher John Searle argued that a large part of social and political reality is ontologically subjective. It exists in the way it does because it is collectively held as doing so. Bits of paper with pictures of the queen are money because we all hold them to be. What we have here is a large scale case of an aspect of social reality with conflicting ideas not just about what it means, but on a very basic level what kind of a concept we are dealing with. It is unsurprising that such a conflict should generate so much chaos, though there are plenty of other reasons for that too.





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