Gaming out a Government of National Unity

As the October article 50 extension deadline approaches talks of a so called government of national unity (GONU) are making the rounds again. The parliamentary arithmetic makes this outcome unlikely, but if we entertain the possibility, one thing stands out as an oddity: the main players are, at least ostensibly, arguing about who would get the first go at pitching a new Prime Minister. The reason this is odd is because the players seem to have got the game backwards, wanting to have a go at replacing the current government first, when they should want to go last.

Why is this? Imagine, for a moment, that enough MPs are willing to support a GONU in the event that this was the only alternative to a no deal Brexit at the end of this month. This may well not be the case, but we have to assume it is for arguments about who goes first to be worthwhile (if not, there is no situation in which any GONU occurs). It is also true that no GONU has the backing of enough MPs as a first choice (in other words, any GONU would have to be supported by MPs who would rather support some other GONU if this were possible). The numbers are likely such that any grouping has an effective veto on a GONU if they want to use it. But this means having the first shot at forming a GONU is curse: provided you can be sure there will be a subsequent opportunity for another group of MPs to try and form a GONU, and provided in the last instance this will by default have the numbers to carry a confidence motion (because this is the only alternative to no deal), the ideal situation is to be the last group of MPs which can attempt to form a GONU.

Put more concretely, imagine the following scenario. There is a successful vote of no confidence in the government. The Labour leadership attempts to form a government, but is denied support by the Lib Dems and most of the former Tory rebels. The latter two cobble together some support for another a government led by Ken Clarke. It is likely this is the last opportunity to form a GONU before the 14 days of the fixed term parliament act expire. In that instance, the Labour leadership would face the choice of supporting the GONU, or denying this support, which would mean a no deal Brexit. What's more, given that attention and memory would likely focus on this last chance, were the Labour leadership to deny a GONU support, they would likely (reasonably or otherwise) get the lion's share of the blame for what happens next.

It is clear then, that if these assumptions are correct, having the first shot at forming a government of national unity is a poisoned chalice. This makes sense of the recent exchanges between the Labour and Lib Dem leadership. The Labour leadership insists that not only that they are given the first chance, but that support is given before a vote of no confidence for a Labour led GONU. Swinson's counter offer- give it a try, and if it fails, others can have a go, does not answer this problem for the Labour leadership, as it gives rise to precisely the situation outlined. Should any of this matter? Of course not. Who leads a short GONU with a limited mandate is of little importance, given the gravity of the situation at hand. Unfortunately, it might matter a great deal to the parties involved.