Making sense of right wing anti-elitism

Ian Dunt made some pretty disparaging comments about a certain Brexit backing pub tycoon earlier today. Julia Hartley Brewer had the following response: 

"Can someone remind me of the name of the multimillion pound company that Ian Dunt started and how many thousands of people he employs? Asking for a friend..."


This would be uninteresting, until you remember that Hartley Brewer is very much part of the 'ordinary people against the elites' brand of social conservative. What's more, the pairing is quite common. Right wing populists rail against the 'elites' yet have no problem with supporting some pretty wealthy and influential people; indeed at times use that wealth as something impressive and worthy of deference. The ultimate example of this is perhaps support for Donald Trump (who Brewer herself does not support), but it's quite a familiar pattern of engagement.


How can we make sense of this? One explanation is just to see it as a straight contradiction. There is probably something in this, as I suspect an awful lot of arguments in what we now call 'debate' are essentially epiphenomenal. They don't reveal people's real motives, are generally ex post facto rationalisations, and whether or not they remain effective or are dumped in favour of a different rationalisation has little impact on what the speaker (and to some extent audience) believes. At most they are about riling up supporters and detractors alike.


But there is a kind of consistency of this anti-elite rhetoric, although only if we appreciate what is actually understood by the term 'elite' by the populist right. What constitutes elite status is about education, profession and political disposition more than wealth or power per se. Elite status in this worldview is held by academics, civil servants, members of the judiciary, and those who work in international non-private institutions. In other words, they are the (generally liberal) professional classes who work in the legal, economic and political administration of the modern state and the international framework within which it operates. When coupled with a belief that the problems with the world stem from institutional order, rather than common sense action, this makes sense both of the anti-elite rhetoric of the populist right and some of their preoccupations. In Britain, the elite are judges, civil servants, liberal and left wing academics and of course the EU. This is a classic crisis of modernity type of thinking. What is opposed is institutional rationality and rule by process, in favour of the common sense thinking of the every day.


In this context, who would best represent the sentiments of this anti-elitism? Figures who make no particular claim to technical or specialist knowledge, and no claim to acumen in law, politics or statescraft. People like Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, or even Jacob Rees Mogg, provided he presents his education in terms of obscure rather than technical knowledge and his social status as aristocratic rather than professional upper middle class. This could easily go alongside wealth or power (particularly when coupled with conspiracy theories about power really being held by a specific, different group of people). Indeed, it can easily be accompanied by deference to wealth and power, provided it is achieved in the right way, and with the right attitude. And the particular appeal of this type of thought now would make sense: we have seen both a massive shift in the economy to the type of jobs which give a premium to education, and a cultural ascendancy of the attitudes of those who have this. Right wing populism can appeal to those who have lost either socially or economically from this change. This may go some way to explaining who, exactly, counts as members of the ‘elite’ in this worldview.


Brexit radicalisation

Pete North, one of the founders of the Leave Alliance, a small pro-Brexit campaign group, released the following tweet this morning: 

"Brexit is a culture war. It is a fight to the death. A fight for democracy itself. It is not good enough to simply leave the EU. We must comprehensively win if we want to save Britain from the destructive paranoia of our rulers. "

This remark is an extreme example of something all too visible: the radicalisation of some Brexiteers, both in tone and content. Victory must be total and metaphorically violent. We see this in the description of MPs as traitors and the demand for a 'no deal' resolution to article 50 negotiations. And it has not gone at all unnoticed how different these demands are to what was said in the referendum campaign.

How did we get here? If we start with the shift in goals, one way of explaining this is a thesis popularised by James O'brien: the movement towards 'no deal' is essentially about avoiding having to give any specific plans about what to do next. A variant on this would be to say that the varying and contradictory demands of Brexiteers could ultimately only coalesce around a negative proposition. A third alternative would be to see the shift as intentional- 'no deal' could never be advocated in a campaign, but was the ultimate desired outcome, or at least the best way of achieving something akin to that as circumstances unraveled. I think these are important and persuasive, and to the extent that the third and first two propositions are contradictory, I suspect the third motivation is less at work. What, I think, they miss, is another, completely different element at work: the self reinforcing radicalisation of Brexiteers in their outlook and attitude.

For this process of psychological and rhetorical radicalisation to make sense to make sense, we have to understand two central mechanism: firstly, the logic of implementation, given the way the referendum was set up, and secondly, the peculiar dynamics of the so called Brexit culture war.

The first point is quite simple. The 2016 referendum had no legal status beyond being advisory. Leave won, but without the support of the then government, or the majority of MPs, or any mechanism for these two facts to automatically change. There was no constitutional guide as to what should happen next, it was all a matter of extra-legal interpretation of what ought to (or what was good politics). Brexiteers were well aware of this, and correctly, or at least rationally, assessed that Brexit could only occur if both MPs and a large chunk of the public continued to believe that it ought to. This meant that the traditional separation of respecting the legitimacy of process and the correctness of the decision somewhat vanished. Provided it could be contemplated that Brexit would not be implemented, or not implemented as desired, if opinion changed, continuing to argue Brexit was a bad idea could indeed potentially have undermined the result. It was not like a general election, where it is easy to subscribe to the validity of the process without liking the outcome. The complexity of the decision and the need for continual and active involvement of those who instinctively did not like it fundamentally blurred this distinction. A key strategic requirement for Brexiteers in this context was to delegitimise opposition. It was this need, as much as the atmosphere of the time, which sowed the seeds of claims that opponents of Brexit were traitors.

The absence of legal parameters also fundamentally changed the accepted criteria for success. Leave got away without precisely defining what Brexit should mean, and once they won, definition was a retroactive activity. Hardliners were always going to be in a position to claim to be the authentic voices of what Brexit was about. Once the settled metric for deciding what Brexit should mean was retroactively asking ‘what is most in keeping with the rationale for voting leave?’, this set in motion a competitive process for finding the most extreme and uncompromising definition, which would naturally seem most authentic. This was not helped by the reality of the available options for leaving, which did not allow for any of the substantive content of the campaign to be implemented without a radical break from the single market. And once the debate became about the correct interpretation of leavers’ rationale for Brexit, whether achieving these goals was worth it, a good idea, or in fact insane became a second order question at best, and indeed an illegitimate one for hardliners. 

The second point has to do with the dynamics of culture wars. By accident or intent, Brexit has become a focal point of general cultural tensions between liberalism and social conservatism. Very few people on either side are much interested in the complexities of how the EU functions, and to some extent support or opposition is a proxy for indicating general political outlook. This has, one way or another, led to the belief that somehow these differences will be resolved by one side 'winning' or 'losing' the dispute, when democratic politics should on some level be about compromise. Both leavers and remainers see an urgency to this, and for both it is about loss. Remainers are worried about the demise of liberalism, this fear extenuated by comparisons of right wing populism to inter-war fascist movements. For the Brexiteers, it is about the perceived slow loss of social conservatism to progressivism, and the loss of status of social conservatives in the media and broader society. 

Political mobilisation in this environment is most easily achieved by appealing to the tropes of this culture war. This sets in motion a process of cumulative radicalisation. Previously outlandish ideas and rhetorical frames of reference become normalised, and convictions are made ever more solid. The need to continuously excite the passions of radicalised supporters, as well as the desire for attention it satisfies, demands ever more outlandish ideas. And the perceived radicalism of political opponents makes the desire for victory more vivid and more totalising in nature. 

This is quite a disturbing thing to witness, and it is easy to lose sight of how quickly this has occurred. Fortunately these ostentatious displays of fanaticism probably do not play well beyond certain core audiences, and I suspect ultimately makes bad politics. And more fortunately still, the UK remains a country where democratic politics is the only means whereby this fanaticism can achieve power. But I do not find this more than a partial comfort. 

Explanation at the margins


Large scale historical events often have deep causes, but useful explanations may also be at the margins. A decent account of the origins of the First World War might well talk about the alliance system, the nature pre 1914 European diplomacy, or the expectation of conflict, but it might also talk about the particulars of Serbian domestic politics, or even the implications of train logistics on Russian mobilisation. Elections are no exception, and analysis of Brexit has become an become an industry.

Given the closeness of the result, and its immediate significance for political parties and campaigners, it makes sense that a large amount of time and attention will be given to marginal changes. In a split that is 52% to 48%, any number of small factors can be seen to have determined the result. But there is one factor that has received particular attention: leave voting Labour voters in the North of England.

This is totally fair enough as a causal explanation. It is a quasi-necessary condition of the victory for Leave, and of course of particular interest to both the Labour and Conservative parties, given that this group has been regarded, perhaps incorrectly, as now a swing group. It is also a valid enough focus for stressing as a causal factor, as it was (to some) in violation of expectations. The problem is when this is conflated with an account of the general character of the leave vote. About 23% (a large chunk, but not the largest) of the Leave vote came from the North of England, and a much smaller group northern labour voters. The largest group of leave voters were Conservative and from the south.

Why has this conflation become so widespread? I think there are a number of reasons why this would occur. For the Conservative party and press, this narrative acts as a means of legitimising the vote. The stereotype lends itself to the idea of the authentic, ordinary person. This is probably what is meant as much by the ‘will of the people’ as a numerical majority (socially conservative politicians talked up the authenticity of this stereotype long before they had grounds to claim it represented a numerical majority). For Labour, it is partly about worrying about losing certain core constituencies, but also partly a tendency on the left to view destabilising events with mass support as driven by the working class.

This conflation is important to recognise, as it can lead to significant misunderstandings of recent events. It can also blind people to important new developments, in particular, that Labour supporters in the North have shown a significant swing away from supporting Brexit.

Some thoughts on causation


What does it mean for one event to cause another? One place to start with this question would be to distinguish between causally necessity and causal sufficiency. We can say A is a causally sufficient condition of B if A always causes B, and a causally necessary condition of B if B cannot occur without A. Fulfilling one or more of these conditional relationships might be a property of a cause, but it cannot be a necessary or sufficient condition of causality. This can be illustrated on a case-by-case basis.

First off, we would have to add the additional condition that for condition A to cause be it also has to occur prior to B. This is not true of A merely being a condition of B. Sufficiency and necessity are about the logic of occurrence, not the mechanics of processes. Getting prescription lenses is a (quasi) sufficient condition of having poor eyesight, but not a cause (all people with prescription lenses have bad eyesight). The causality is the other way round. This restriction also has to be made of necessary causes. Someone might always wear a coat when it is cold outside. This would make wearing a coat a necessary condition of coldness (it cannot be cold without this person wearing a coat). But the cause here is also backwards.

Even if we add in the restriction of a condition being prior to its effect to be a cause, I don’t think this conditionality can be a necessary or sufficient condition for causation. Shooting someone at close range is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for someone’s death, but it can be a cause. Causation therefore does not necessarily fulfil either conditionality relationship. But is the fulfilment of this conditionality, if the events are in the right sequence, a sufficient condition of causation? Also no, I think. Imagine someone who only orders a particular dish when they go to a certain restaurant. They also always drink a glass of water with any meal. Ordering that dish is a sufficient condition for drinking a glass of water, and drinking a glass of water is a necessary condition for having that dish, but neither delivers any kind of causal explanation of the other. We can shift round the order in which the events happen in any way we like, by imagining some additional conditions (perhaps drinks are always served first, perhaps this person prefers to have their meal before their drink.)

What about fulfilling both relations, i.e A being a necessary and sufficient condition of B? This is the suggestion of the philosopher David Lewis.  The problem with this is it implies an event can be caused by another if and only if it is impossible for that event to be caused by something else instead of that particular cause. This cannot be a necessary condition of causality. What’s more, if we modify the restaurant example, it cannot be a sufficient one either. Perhaps someone always and only orders a particular drink at a restaurant and only and always orders a particular meal at that same restaurant. Both can be necessary and sufficient conditions for one another without the implication of causation.

We might then say, OK, so this necessity and sufficiency are not necessary or sufficient conditions of causal relationships, but might they still be common properties? My problem here is that when dealing with phenomena on the macro level, this is almost never actually true of causal relationships. A politician may win an election by a landslide, but perhaps if they were found to have committed a murder the week beforehand they would not have done so. As for necessity, when it comes to the interesting conditions, it is equally always possible to imagine different conditions, which might have produced the same result. Perhaps Trump would not have won in 2016 without winning Pennsylvania and Florida, but these conditions aren’t strictly necessary. Perhaps he might have won California.

One way of trying to resolve this problem is to think about these conditions in probabilistic terms. It is, after all, logically possible for Trump to have won the Presidency without winning Pennsylvania or Florida, but it is however highly unlikely that that ever would have occurred. Smoking may not always cause cancer, but it sure does increase the probability of it occurring. This too has some problems with it. Imagine I can only just afford my rent, and I only pay the rent on time every other month, when I manage to restrain myself at the weekend. If I buy a lottery ticket, in all probability I am decreasing my chances of having enough money to pay the rent. But in the event that a surprised landlord asks me how I managed to pay the rent for the last 6 months on time, the fact that I bought a lottery ticket could indeed be cause, if it wins, even though buying it actually decreased the probability of the event occurring.

One way one might try and get out of these difficulties is through a kind of modified ceteris paribus. Causal explanations do not require absolute necessity, it simply has to be the case that all other things being equal an event would not have occurred without a particular condition being the case. A similar counterpart can be thought of for sufficiency. The problem with this, is we can never really specify what the other things are which have to be equal. It might then be said that we don’t have to, we just have to assume no additional change. This is fine for a model, where we can think of a closed system with a finite number of elements. But the world is complex, and the counterfactual has to be presumed to occur in this complex world, one where the result of the other conditions being ‘the same’ is unclear in the counterfactual (or whether, indeed, it is coherent to think of them as being such). 


Perhaps the best way forward is to ditch this kind of thinking about causation in large scale historical developments, and to leave the formal logic of conditions to models which seek to provide abstract generalisations. This is possible if we take explanations of historical developments as a fundamentally different activity from modelling. Models seek generalities as to what will happen (or assign a probability to an outcome) under certain precisely specified conditions. Historical explanations accept the complexity of the world and the fact that the conditions are not fully known or describable. They are therefore more about resolving mysteries: they make an event comprehensible and seek to render it unsurprising. It is not the same as finding a way of making the event likely, let alone necessary, merely getting us to the point where nothing seems to violate our fundamental expectations of how the world works. We might replace causal sufficiency and necessary statements more like the following: given what we know about the situation, does it make sense that under these circumstances, something like this would occur? Or would we, but for this particular fact, find the development puzzling, in a way that violates the way we assume the world works? 

Against Factoids

As most reading this will know, recently on Question Time Jacob Rees Mogg attempted to defend British concentration camps in the Boer war. He did so by claiming that the death rate in the camps was comparable to Glasgow's at the time. This, of course, is entirely false, as shown by this excellent article here. But by the time this and similar articles were put out, the damage was already done. A much larger number of people will have seen Mogg's defense than the refutations; moreover, the audience he is targeting is precisely the one which will not read the latter. The desired effect is achieved, and Mogg will almost certainly be able to avoid all too much further scrutiny of that particular point.

Why did this work? The easy explanation would be to blame the other members of the panel. Couldn't they have called him out on this in real time? This would be almost impossible without taking a significant risk. In order to assert, without prior preparation, with confidence that Mogg's comments were false, you would not only have to be someone with a good working knowledge of the Boer war, you would also have to be someone who happened to know rather a lot of precise information about the demographics of Glasgow at the turn of the 20th Century. I am not sure how many people in the world fit this description. I would not be surprised if the answer was zero.

This is of course not the same as being able to sense right away that his comments are dubious. When I first saw the clip, my initial reaction was that the comparison sounded rather implausible. But I had to wait for a while to be able to confirm that it was definitively false. A participant in a televised discussion like Question Time would have to act on that hunch, and in doing so take a significant risk themselves. They might well be able to tell that something is not right about what is being asserted, but it is very difficult in that situation to know if the remark is false per se, or merely misleading (imagine, for example, that there was a particular outbreak of disease in Glasgow at that time). In this sense Mogg's claim was a factoid par excellence. It is almost impossible to falsify on the spot, as without some time researching, it is highly unlikely that you will be able to say exactly what is wrong with it.

This strategy is quite a common one in televised discussions. The strategy is to use a fact that, even if it were true, would be so obscure that nobody will be able to refute it in real time. Mogg has done this several times before. In March 2017, he claimed on the Daily Politics that a no deal Brexit was nothing to fear because of a little known paragraph in a WTO agreement allowed for a new party to maintain any existing trade relations for up to 10 years. Once again, this was, eventually, refuted, and you can read the refutation here. But once again, nobody could realistically have done this in real time. How, after all, can you be certain that there is no paragraph in any document in the history of the WTO which might contain something which loosely fits his description? You would either need to exhaustively search databases or find something directly in contradiction.

These incidents paint a disturbing picture. It is quite possible to achieve your desired aim in a televised discussion by bamboozling your opponent with statements designed to be for all intents and purposes irrefutable. This has become a standard strategy of the alt-right. The only defense against it requires a change in broadcast culture. It requires broadcasters to either refuse to have on air participants who repeatedly and maliciously use this kind of factoid, or, at the very least, they should face real and specific scrutiny every time they appear on air subsequently and be taken to town on previous false or misleading statements. The latter is probably not even enough, as it gives further publicity to these individuals. But even that would be an improvement on the status quo.

What does the Labour split mean for the People's Vote campaign?

The split of 7 Labour MP from the party is something of great significance beyond what it implies for Brexit, but, for better or worse, that's where my thoughts are now.

What does this split mean for the People's Vote campaign? Spinning Hugo (I don't know him by any other name but his pseudonym) believes it signifies the fact that the chances of a second referendum had become slim. If there were a prospect of moving the leadership in that direction, the newly formed Independent Group would have waited at least until after Brexit to form a group, in the hope of influencing the party leadership beforehand. This seems plausible enough to me, but it's a distinct question for what effects this move will have on the campaign.

These surely depend on how both the independents and rest of the Labour Party respond. If the Independent Group don't show any interest (in this case very soon) on forming a new party, the impact will be small. What limited impact it will have is likely negative, as key proponents of a second vote are now longer in the party.

If, on the other hand, they do, and opposing Brexit is a part of their policy platform, what happens next very much depends on how the Labour leadership read the situation. A clever response would be to recognise that the new danger this presents to Labour electorally is a move of socially liberal, europhile voters to whatever party this new group ends up forming. This does not have to be large to represent a real threat to Labour's hopes of forming a majority government. The easiest way of stemming any move in that direction would be to announce support for a second referendum. This would also eclipse any negative discussion of the split in the news. For this to work, it would have to happen very soon indeed. I am, however, not optimistic that it will.

Is a nuanced public discussion about Churchill possible?

One thing that struck me most when I lived in Germany is the difference between discussions about national history there compared with the U.K. This of course has a lot to do with the unique horrors of 20th Century German history. The development of public discussions, or 'Vergangenheitsbetwältigung' (overcoming the past) on these was slow, fraught with generational politics and driven at times only by major events (public trials of Nazis in the 1960s, publication of particular articles by historians etc). But the long term result has extended beyond discussion specifically of Nazism and to a popular public discourse on history which is less inclined to thinking about national heroes. Yes, there are figures like Konrad Adenauer who hold a place in national mythology, but I doubt there would much of an uproar if a major politician criticised Adenauer. This has more than once led me to wonder: however disanalogous the horrors of empire may be, might it be worth having a more open discussion about recent British history?

The events of the last week have at shown that this can have unintended consequences, or at the very least that the legacy of Winston Churchill might not be the place to start. There has rightly been uproar at Jacob Rees Mogg's comments on Question Time in defence of concentration camps in the Boer War. Robert Saunder's has written a excellent refutation of his remarks here, though others have too. What Mogg's comments show is precisely how these discussions can go wrong. It seems entirely reasonable to ask for a nuanced discussion about Churchill which includes aspects of him which we should not be comfortable with. But what if the result of that is not nuance, but simply that people now feel obliged to defend even the most horrific things he is associated with? Perversely, this could actually be worse than not having had the discussion at all. If  public discussion of a national figure is limited to a selective national mythology, the bad bits are just omitted. This may actually be more conducive to progressive attitudes than the situation in which they are actively defended.

And what kind of nuance are we hoping to achieve anyway? Deciding whether Churchill's role in the second world war on balance allows him to still be a hero in spite of the Bengal Famine is not really a useful analytic question. Sometimes totalising judgements are necessary, like when deciding who to elect. But for the most part, they are of little analytic use, and we are probably better off trying to avoid taking a position about an individual overall. If discussions about Churchill mean people feel obliged to actively and consciously take a position on this question, we might all be the worse off for it. It might be better to leave public discussion a ritual very few put much thought into, and those who do think about these questions just ignore. Honest public discussions of the brutality and cruelty of the British Empire might better start elsewhere.